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LAWYER/NON-LAWYER DECISIONS IN
ADJUDICATION OF PUBLIC
CONTRACT CLAIMS: A STUDY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
Dov M. Grunschlag*
I. INTRODUCTION
Large throngs of attorneys populate today's vast governmental
preserves,' but in no officialdom are attorneys sole inhabitants.
Always there are others, of all professional coats and non-profes-
sional hues. Attorneys in government do not normally have for-
mal authority within the executive branch to determine with finality
rights and obligations arising out of the performance of official
functions. This paper examines some of the ramifications of the
presence of non-lawyers in the domain of legal rights and obliga-
tions. The particular preserve chosen for observation is the Depart-
ment of Water Resources of the State of California.
II. THE SETTING FOR CONTRACT DISPUTES
A primary task of the Department in recent years has been
to administer an extensive governmental undertaking, the State
Water Project.' The Project was designed to deliver water to dry
areas of the state. Work has been performed by private enterprise
pursuant to contracts with the Department, a classic method for
* Professor of Law, King Hall, University of California School of Law, Davis;
A.B. 1963, LL.B. 1966, Columbia University. This paper is a modified version of a
talk presented March 4, 1970, to the Department of Civil Engineering, University of
California, Davis.
1 The government departments of the State of California, for example, employ
some 520 attorneys, not counting approximately 190 lawyers on the staff of the At-
torney General. There are 28 attorneys on the staff of the Department of Water
Resources, with which this paper is primarily concerned. DEPARTMENT OF WATER
RESOURCES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL 2 (1969) (herein-
after cited as 1969 Report).
2 The term State Water Project is extensively used by the Department in various
charts and documents, but there appears to be no statutory use of that term. The
State Water Project is a conglomerate of several "projects" pertaining to water or
dams that the Department is designated as having authority to construct pursuant to
CAL. WATER CODE § 123 (West 1971). The Central Valley Project Act, codified in
Part 3 of Division 6 of the Water Code, contains the authorization for much of the
Department's construction. These various projects are part of the California Water
Plan, described in Bulletin No. 3 of the Department (1957).
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the discharge of official duties requiring large construction efforts.'
The standard four-article contrac incorporates by reference
several key documents that embody the rights and obligations
of the parties: the private party's bid, including not only the bid
schedule but also a Bidder's Agreement and Bidding Requirements
and Conditions; Standard Provisions running to some forty pages
and governing all Department contracts; and Special Provisions,
typically a longer document detailing the technical specifications
for the work covered by the particular contract. In addition to
signatures of the contracting parties, the contract bears the signa-
ture of a representative of the Attorney General of the State, who
certifies that the contract is "in accordance with the provisions
of the State Contract Act" 5-a reminder that the Department
derives its powers, and limitations thereon, from the Legislature.
The Sources of Contract Disputes
Not surprisingly, the embodiment of the parties' rights and
obligations in formal legal documents does not ensure eternally
peaceful co-existence between them. The complexity of much of
the construction for the State Water Project, and the large finan-
cial stakes involved, naturally give rise to disputes between the
Department and its private contractors. The Department might
demand that the contractor perform particular work or proceed
in a particular manner, which the contractor contends he did not
undertake to do. Ordered to perform as demanded, the contractor
might do so, but claim additional compensation. If the Depart-
ment's representatives persist in their contention that the private
party merely was ordered to perform the work as originally re-
quired by the contract, a formal dispute about the meaning of the
contract may be at hand. Such disputes can arise in other ways
as well: the private party might perform work that the Depart-
ment's representatives contend was not required by the contract,
and hence that no payment therefor should be made; or, the
Department's representatives might order deletion of work, an
action that the private party contends the contract precludes; or,
3 Private industry has built dams, pipelines, power plants, and other paraphernalia
of water delivery and storage. The technical specifications governing conduct of the
particular work are prepared by the Department, in a document that embodies 
the
requirements to which the private contractor must adhere. The work is awarded 
to
the successful bidder who undertakes to perform it according to the specifications 
at
a particular price to the State, "acting by and through" the Department.
4 See a copy of the standard contract in Appendix A.
5 See State Contract Act, CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 14250 to 14424 (West 1963 and
West Supp. 1971). For the requirement on competitive bidding, see CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 14256 (West Supp. 1971) and CAL. Gov'T CODE § 14330 (West 1963).
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the Department's representatives might order a change in the work
that the private party contends the contract does not contemplate.
Whenever, regardless of its precise origin, a dispute of thiskind reaches the status of a claim by the private party against
the Department, the administrative process for its resolution is
set in motion. The Department is now no longer merely a party to
the dispute. It now becomes its arbiter as well.6 This article specifi-
cally concerns this process taking place within the confines of
the Department, for it is here that the Department's lawyers must
share responsibility for the determination of legal rights and obliga-
tions with the Department's engineers.
III. AN OVER-ALL VIEW OF THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
Before examining the roles of lawyers and engineers in the
Department's decision-making process, it is useful to observe the
over-all structure of that process.7
As will be seen below, it is the decision of the Department's
Deputy Director that constitutes the Department's decision of a
6 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 14378 (West Supp. 1971) provides as follows:
Every contract subject to this chapter ... shall provide that monetary claims
totaling in the aggregate twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or less on
any contract and filed in accordance with procedures set forth in such con-tract may, at the option of the contractor or the department, be subject todetermination of rights under the contract in accordance with Section 14379.
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 14379 (West 1971) provides as follows:(a) Determination of rights pursuant to Section 14378 shall be by a hearing
officer appointed for that purpose from the staff of the Officer of Administra-
tive Procedure. (b) The party seeking a determination of rights shall give
notice in writing of the claim setting forth the facts on which the claim isbased to the other party and to the Office of Administrative Procedure. TheOffice of Administrative Procedure shall appoint a hearing officer to hear such
claim. The hearing officer shall be appointed within 60 days after such notice,but not before completion of the contract, unless the department consents to
earlier appointment, and the hearing officer shall hear and determine the
controversy and render his decision in writing within 60 days after his ap-pointment, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, provided, however, that forgood cause, the hearing officer may extend such time. Each party shall bearits own costs and shall pay one-half of the costs of the hearing. (c) Thedecision of the hearing officer shall be final if supported by law and by
substantial evidence.
As of this writing, neither the Department nor a private contractor has elected
to proceed in accordance with the "determination of rights" procedure. The Depart-
ment's abstention is easily understood as evidence of preference for, and satisfaction
with, its internal processes for resolving claims. The failure of contractors to elect the
new procedure may be explained on several grounds: the financial unattractiveness of
the cost-sharing provision, particularly in light of the monetary limit on the claim;
satisfaction with the fairness of the Department's process; a judgment that the
chances of winning are better in a particular case through the Department's process;
reluctance to learn new formalities of procedure; or, reluctance to engage in expected
initial arguments concerning the nature and scope of the hearing officer's authority.
7 See Appendix B and C.
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claim." In some instances, however, the decision can be made by
the field engineer in charge of the project with which the claim
is associated. Decisions of field engineers are typically made pur-
suant to consultation with a member of the Department's legal
staff."
Should the dispute continue, it will be presented for a decision
by the Chief of the Construction Branch. I ° Until July 1, 1971, the
initial decision within the Department (excluding field level deci-
sions) was lodged in the Division Engineer, Division of Design
and Construction. A vacancy in that position resulted in a transfer
of the Division Engineer's claims decision authority to the Chief
of the Construction Branch." At this level of Departmental deci-
sion-making, legal advice is again obtained.
Finally, an appeal from the decision of the Chief of the Con-
struction Branch may be lodged by the contractor with the Deputy
Director. 2 Acting in an advisory capacity to the Deputy Director
is a Claims Appeal Board, consisting of two engineers and one
attorney.
The decision of the Deputy Director is the final one within
the Department; it is the decision that is subject to review by
the courts, as will be seen below.
Engineer Authority in Dispute Resolution
In his contract with the Department, the private contractor
promises to perform the work "in accordance with the drawings,
specifications and all other parts of this contract, and to the satis-
faction of the Engineer. . . ,,' (Article II). The Engineer is defined
in Section 1 of the Standard Provisions (Definitions) as "The
Deputy Director, acting either directly or through authorized
representatives . . . ." Section 6(a) of the Standard Provisions
(Control of the Work) confers upon the Engineer "authority to
decide all questions as to interpretation and fulfillment of contract
requirements ... ." when "exercising the specific authority granted
him under other provisions of the contract and in any case not
covered by such specific authority ... " Section 8(c) of the Stan-
8 See Appendix B.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Memorandum from Chief Counsel to the Director of the Department, re:
Modification of Construction Contract Procedures, dated June 30, 1971, and approved
by the Director July 1, 1971, with respect to the change in decision making authority.
12 See Appendix B.
13 See Appendix A (emphasis added).
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dard Provision (Claims) is the critical provision governing the
Engineer's role in the resolution of contract disputes:
The Engineer shall decide all claims of the Contractor arising under
and by virtue of the contract, and his decision, whether on the merits
of the claim or on its timeliness, shall be final and conclusive unlessit is fraudulent, capricious, arbitrary, or so grossly erroneous as neces-
sarily to imply bad faith.
The foregoing authority of the Engineer will be administered asfollows, unless another procedure, uniform in application, is adoptedfor Department contracts and the Contractor is notified thereof in writ-
ing.
Claims will be decided by a designated representative of theDeputy Director, who will furnish his decisions to the Contractor in
writing. The representative's decision on a claim shall be final and con-
clusive, as provided above, unless within 30 days after receipt thereof
the Contractor makes written request for review and decision of the
claim by the Deputy Director. Following such request, the Deputy
Director will consider the entire claim, as submitted to his representa-
tive, and issue his decision to the Contractor in writing, which shall
be final and conclusive as provided above....
Engineer Authority and Judicial Review
The primacy of the Engineer in the resolution of contract
claims is recognized by the courts, which may review the Engineer's
decision at the instance of the Contractor following exhaustion of
the administrative process within the Department 4 and by theState Board of Control.15 Judicial utterances about the scope of
the Engineer's authority and about the nature of evidence necessary
to overturn his exercise of it generally echo the Department's con-
tractual provisions. The courts recognize the Engineer's authority
to make a decision that "may entail interpretation of the contract
language or specifications; application of a rule of law, or of con-
tract interpretation, to agreed facts; or a resolution of disputed
facts."'" The court will not disturb the Engineer's decisions upon
14 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11523 (West 1966).
15 The State Board of Control consists of the Controller and the Director ofFinance, acting ex-officio, and an appointed member. It handles the particular claims
against the State whose settlement has been provided by statute. In disputes againstthe Department of Water Resources, the Board merely serves to review Departmentdecisions. It is not an alternative method of dispute settlement in this instance. SeeCAL. GoV'T CODE §§ 13901-13926 (West Supp. 1971), defining the nature of the Board
and its general functions. See also CAL. GOV'T CODE § 905.2 (West 1970), detailing theBoard's function in money claims.
16 Clack v. State, 275 Cal. App. 2d 743, 747, 80 Cal. Rptr. 274, 276 (1969). The
references in this and subsequent footnotes are not derived from cases reviewingdecisions of the Department of Water Resources. There appear to be no such reporteddecisions. The cases cited, however, involve closely analogous situations. Significantly,these are the decisions that the Department's legal staff deems to govern review of the
[Vol. 12
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a showing that it is against "the weight of the evidence," but only
upon a showing of "gross error" or "arbitrariness" in decision.'
7
Without placing undue stress on the importance of these formula-
tions as the efficient causes for particular judicial decisions, it is
possible to derive two general observations from them. First, they
suggest that the courts may be disinclined to engage in a thorough
review of a technical record upon which the Engineer has exercised
a professional judgment, even though the ultimate decision by the
Engineer is phrased in terms of rights and duties under a contract.
Second, the courts may utilize their power of review to promote
the rationality and fairness of the administrative process involved
in the Engineer's decision. Thus, the courts will review the decision
for "fraud, constructive fraud, bad faith, or a failure to exercise
honest judgment.' 8 The process of decision must be a rational one:
if no "reasoning arbiter would agree" with the decision, it cannot
stand. 9 The decision must be made by an impartial arbiter:
[I]n determinations under this type of contract, the high point in
the architect's practice of his profession lies in those instances when, in
order to do justice to the contractor, he has to oppose the desire of
his employer. . . . When he acts under a contract as the official inter-
preter of its conditions and the judge of its performance, he should
favor neither side, but exercise impartial judgement.
20
The more rational the process of decision, the less need there will
be to scrutinize each decision for error. Put another way, the more
rational and fair the process, the more reliable will be the decisions
emanating from it.
IV. THE LEGAL STAFF AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The existence of a legal staff is obviously founded on the
assumption that the work of lawyers is at least useful and at most
indispensable to the attainment of fairness and rationality. It is
now time to examine the role of the Department's lawyers with an
eye to ascertaining the ways in which that assumption assumes
practical dimensions.
Attorney Liaison with Field Engineers
The lawyer's work begins at field level even prior to the in-
stitution of a formal claim against the Department. The field
Department's administrative determinations. See Dauer and McLeod, Administrative
Claims Procedure, in California Public Contract Law Conference (1970).
17 Id. at 749, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 278.
18 Macomber v. State, 250 Cal. App. 2d 391, 397, 58 Cal. Rptr. 393, 398 (1967).
19 Clack v. State, 275 Cal. App. 2d 743, 747, 80 Cal. Rptr. 274, 276 (1969).
20 Macomber v. State, 250 Cal. App. 2d 391, 397-98, 53 Cal. Rptr. 393, 398 (1967).
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engineer in charge of a particular construction project has authority
to issue change orders, requiring the contractor to do additional
work for which he will receive additional compensation.21 Limited
by a monetary amount of $25,000, the authority to issue such
change orders is a useful device for aborting incipient disputes.
The Department's attorneys' function is to insure that there is
an adequate legal basis for the issuance of a change order pur-
suant to which the contractor receives additional compensation. In1967, the Department eliminated the requirement of mandatory
legal review of such orders.22 In its place, the program of attorney
liaison with construction project offices was initiated in the summer
of 1967.23 Emphasizing personal communication between attorneys
and field engineers, the program is designed to bring attorneys into
early stages of incipient problems. Engineers thereby receive legal
advice at an opportune time, and that advice is in turn improvedby familiarity with the local physical situation. In the view of the
Department's Chief Counsel, the liaison program also usefully re-
duces the incidence of change orders justified by project engineers
with such "meaningless recitals" as that the order was "not illegal"
or was "within the scope of the work."24
Legal Advice to Division Engineer
The liaison program signifies that in many cases, legal advice
has been furnished prior to the actual occurrence of a claim by
the private contractor against the Department. The fact that a claim
is presented for resolution by the Division Engineer, Design andConstruction,25 means that it has been denied by the project engi-
neer, whose action in many cases was probably taken in at leastpartial reliance on the liaison attorney's legal advice. The Depart-
21 The authority is embodied in Delegation Order 202(g) by the Deputy Director,
entitled "Approval of Contract Change Orders." The pertinent provisions are:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: That the Chief of the Construction Branch isauthorized to sign and approve all change orders issued to the Department's
contractors under applicable sections of Standard Provisions for ConstructionContracts, and Standard Provisions for Procurement Contracts, and is au-
thorized to make or cause to be made all findings, determinations, and ordersin connection therewith; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: That authority maybe redelegated to the Chief of the Equipment and Materials Section and toProject Engineers to sign and approve change orders that are not in excess
of $25,000 and/or 30 days time extension.
22 Memo from Director, Department of Water Resources, to the Deputy Di-
rector, State Water Project, Chief Counsel, and Chief, Construction Branch, datedAug. 1, 1967, Re: Administration and Legal Review of Construction Contract Change
Orders.
23 DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL
3 (1968) (hereinafter cited as 1968 Report).
24 1968 Report 14.
25 See note 11 and accompanying text, supra.
[Vol. 12
19721 ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIMS
ment's legal role, however, does not cease at this point. The division
engineer, who is the representative designated by the Deputy
Director to resolve a contested claim in the first instance,26 custom-
arily makes his decision only after consultation with the legal staff.
Departmental orders require that he "refer all decisions or recom-
mendations on claims estimated to be in excess of $10,000 ...to
the Chief Counsel for legal review prior to release.12 7 As a matter
of practice, the Division Engineer refers all matters to the legal
staff.28
Lawyers and the Claims Appeal Board
The private contractor may seek review of the entire claim
by the Deputy Director, State Water Project, whose decision is
the final one within the Department.29 The Deputy Director's
judgment is based upon not only the legal opinions given at the
Division Engineer level 0 and perhaps at the liaison attorney-
project engineer level, but also by the report of a Claims Appeal
Board."' The Board, consisting of two engineers and one attorney,
reviews the claim and recommends a decision in a report made to
the Deputy Director. 2 Chaired by an engineer, the Board views
26 See Standard Provisions (Claims) § 8C.
27 Delegation Order 200(d), entitled "Contractor Claims," provides in pertinent
part:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: That the Division Engineer, Design and
Construction, is authorized to act on claims submitted by the Department's
contractors as follows:
1. Decide those claims submitted under applicable sections of Standard
Provisions for Construction Contracts under the State Contract Act;
2. Decide those claims submitted under applicable sections of Standard
Provisions for Purchasing Contracts under Sections 14780 through 14824 of
the Government Code;
3. Decide those claims submitted under Standard Agreements (Form 2);
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: That the Division Engineer is authorized to
make or cause to be made all investigations, findings, determinations, requests
and notices in connection with such claims;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: That in exercising this authority the Division
Engineer will refer all decisions or recommendations on claims estimated to
be in excess of $10,000 and/or additional time in excess of 10 days to the
Chief Counsel for legal review prior to release.
28 Conversation with H. G. Dewey, then Division Engineer, January 27, 1970;
conversation with Robert W. James, Assistant Chief Counsel, October 6, 1970.
29 See note 26, supra.
30 See note 11 and accompanying text, supra.
31 The Claims Appeal Board is established pursuant to delegation of authority
by the Deputy Director. Water Resources Directorate Delegation Order No. 206(b),
Authorities of Chairman, Claims Appeal Board, June 8, 1971. (Previous delegation
orders conferring the authority to "review, investigate, and conduct hearings on claims
on construction contracts" were dated April 25, 1967, and June 24, 1969. The Deputy
Director's authority was in turn derived from the Department Director's Delegation
Order No. 4, dated April 10, 1967, which has been revoked and replaced by Delegation
Order No. 12, dated July 16, 1971).
32 See Appendix B.
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its function chiefly as an "investigational" one." In the course of
investigation, the Board, whose members have had no prior con-
nection with the contract or the claim in question, generally holds
an informal hearing. 4 The adversarial relationship between the
Department and the private contractor reflects itself in the hear-
ing. A representative of the Department-possibly the project
engineer whose disagreement with the contractor initially gave rise
to the claim-presents the case for denying the claim.
At a hearing observed by this writer, 5 no Department attorney
was present to assist the project engineer in the defense of his
position. The contractor's case was guided by an attorney for the
firm, who functioned primarily to harness the technical presentations
by two of the firm's engineers into the framework of his legal
position. The hearing was a mixture of factual investigation and
legal argument, without the formal trappings associated with either.
Thus, the field engineers for both parties made factual assertions
about events and understandings that occurred during the claim's
gestative period, but neither gave formal testimony about these
matters. The legal argument was a none-too-neat orchestration in
which the Department's representative, the private contractor's
delegates, and members of the Board engaged in freewheeling con-
trapuntal discussion.
Following the hearing, Board members discuss the case in
an effort to refine the issues involved in the claim and facilitate their
presentation to the Deputy Director. If Board members disagree
about the proposed disposition of the claim, conflicting reports
may be forwarded to the Deputy Director. The Board's views are
not communicated to the private contractor. The Deputy Director
might confer informally with the contractor prior to making the
final Departmental decision. Should the matter be further con-
tested before the State Board of Control, the Department's lawyers
will represent its interests in upholding the Deputy Director's deci-
sion. If the case reaches judicial review, however, the Attorney
General's office assumes the responsibility for representing the
State's interests, with the Department's attorneys the background
personalities providing necessary liaison. 6
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Hearing held in Sacramento, Calif., March 20, 1970. The author is under an
obligation not to disclose the name of the private party, or that of the project in-
volved. The same limitation applies to the other cases discussed in the text below.
36 "The department is authorized to employ legal counsel who .. .may, when
authorized by the Attorney General, represent the department and the State in liti-
gation concerning affairs of the department. In any event, the legal counsel of the
department may, with the approval of the director and with the consent of the court
[Vol. 12
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The Department As Client
A closer examination of the work of the private firm's attorney
at the hearing before the Claims Appeal Board affords valuable
insights into the work of his Departmental counterpart. The dis-
pute between the engineers representing the contracting parties
arose when the Department's Resident Engineer ordered the per-
formance of certain work in the construction of a power plant. The
contractor contended that the work was not required by the con-
tract, and that the Department must therefore award some $11,000
in additional compensation for the additional work. The Resident
Engineer disagreed, and following denial of the claim by the Division
Engineer, the matter was heard before the Claims Appeal Board.
Stripped of its technical complexity, the dispute between the engi-
neers consisted of this question: Did the contract require that the
contractor install, as well as furnish, a particular unit necessary
to the complete functioning of an electrical output system? In
his opening statement, the Department's engineer argued for an
affirmative answer.
The private attorney's role became evident at the outset of his
presentation. His first and most significant move was to reshape the
question itself. Rather than arguing in terms of certainty about what
the contract did or did not require, the attorney addressed himself
to a substantially different question: Does the contract, reasonably
interpreted, require the contractor merely to furnish but not to
install the unit in question? If so, he argued, it is of no consequence
that it would be equally reasonable to interpret the contract in
the contrary manner: The Department, as drafter of the contract
provisions, must bear the risk of contract ambiguity.3 7 To avoid
the application of a provision of the Bidding Requirements and
Conditions that imposes a duty upon the bidder to notify the De-
partment in writing of any ambiguity he discovers prior to bidding
before which the action is pending, present to the court the views of the department
with respect to the action." CAL. WATER CODE § 127 (West 1971). The Department,
lke 125 of California's 135 government agencies, thus depends on the permission of
the Attorney General if it wishes to represent its interests in court. That permission is
almost never given, if indeed it is currently ever requested. The Department's lawyers
are considered "administrative advisers." From conversations with several Department
attorneys, the writer has the sense that their strictly in-house status appears to affect
the performance of their duties, but it seems nearly impossible to identify such effects
with any precision.
37 See A. CoRBNn, CONTRACTS § 559 (Student ed. 1952). But see CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 1654, (West 1970): "In cases of uncertainty not removed by the preceding rules, the
language of a contract should be interpreted most strongly against the party who
caused the uncertainty to exist. The promisor is presumed to be such party; except in
a contract between a public officer or body, as such, and a private party, in which it
is presumed that all uncertainty was caused by the private party." (emphasis added).
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for the contract, 3s the contractor's attorney contended that at the
time of the bid his client had no wind of any contract ambiguity.
In preparing his bid and cost items the contractor made every
effort to understand the contract requirements, and believed that
his interpretation matched the drafter's intentions. Thus, the argu-
ment concluded, the contractor cannot be faulted for any failure
to call attention to what only now appears to be an ambiguity in
the language of the contract.
Having cast the question in this form, the attorney next utilized
the firm's two engineers in the service of the proposition that his
client's contract interpretation was a reasonable one. To establish
this proposition, the contractor set up a structure consisting of
several technical contract provisions, drawings accompanying the
technical specifications, and "academic" definitions of technical
terms involved in the controversy. Although the firm's engineering
representatives were not witnesses in a strict sense, in fact the
attorney utilized them as though they were, attempting to circum-
scribe their "testimony" within the bounds of his legal argument.
The private attorney's performance, it should be recognized,
was a characteristic one for a lawyer representing his client's in-
terests in an adjudicatory setting. The role he assumed was that
of an advocate for his client's position, and he employed the skills
typical of that role: framing the question for decision in a manner
most conducive to producing an answer favorable to his case; con-
structing a scheme bringing together sources of authoritative prin-
ciples and rules; and channelling the available information into
that scheme.
One might suppose that the attorney for the Department would
assume much the same role in the process of claim resolution, the
role of advocate for the client Department's interests. But there
is a fundamental obstacle to the facile analogy between the private
and government attorneys in this process. The Department is only
initially an adversary of the private contractor. It is later his
arbiter, the judge of his claim. In the performance of its adjudica-
tory function, it is expected to exercise honest and impartial judg-
ment. The Department's attorney thus has a client with a unique
38 "If a bidder discovers any ambiguity, conflict, discrepancy, omission, or other
error in the bid documents, he shall immediately notify the Department's Office
Engineer of such error in writing and request modification or clarification of the
documents.... If a bidder fails to notify the Office Engineer, prior to the opening of
bids, of an error in the bid documents known to him, or an error that reasonably
should have been known to him, he shall bid at his own risk and if he is awarded the
contract, he shall not be entitled to additional compensation or time by reason of the
error or its later correction." Bidding Requirements and Conditions, Section (e).
[Vol. 12
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interest-an interest in the disinterested resolution of disputes to
which it is a party. Differences of opinion that arise within the
Department during the claim resolution process probably have their
frequent origin in this difficult posture unusual in human experience.
It should surprise no one, for example, if an attorney incurs the
displeasure of a field engineer when the former delivers legal advice
that negates a course of action preferred by the latter. Nor would
it seem unexpected that an attorney, upon whose advice or that
of a colleague a claim was rejected by the field engineer, might
support the denial in a memorandum to the Division Engineer
that constitutes essentially a legal brief for sustaining the denial.
As a brief, the memorandum would tend to support only one posi-
tion in the best traditions of legal advocacy. Valuable though one-
sided presentations might be for sharpening issues, an inflexible
position on the part of the Department's attorneys would not
generally promote the impartiality desired of the dispute arbiter.
To the extent that difficulties of this kind exist in the claim resolu-
tion process-and there is no evidence that they are of serious
magnitude-the process would benefit from strategic use of person-
nel and timing of advice to minimize the likelihood of hardened
positions.89
V. DIvIsION OF FUNCTIONS BETWEEN LAWYERS
AND ENGINEERS IN CLAIM ADJUDICATION
The roles of attorneys and engineers in the claim resolution
process may be viewed from another perspective as well: which
issues arising in the course of the process are best suited for
resolution by engineers in the exercise of their professional judg-
ment, and which by lawyers in the exercise of theirs? A division
of labor that takes account of the spheres of expertise properly
attributable to the two staffs would promote the rationality of the
process. It would naturally serve a fundamental objective of any
decision-making process-to insure that decisions are made by
those most qualified to make them. A clear division along lines
of professional expertise would also facilitate the administration
of the governmental task, by minimizing the time and energy spent
on intradepartmental jurisdictional worries.
39 Under current practice, the attorney assigned as liaison with the field engineer
will ordinarily continue to work on the claim should it reach the Division Engineer.
The rationale for the practice is that the clear benefit of familiarity with the case
outweighs the possible costs of a hardened position. Conversations with, and super-
vision by other members of the legal staff may also reduce the possibility of such
hardening. Finally, because of turnover in the staff, it happens that the liaison attorney
will no longer be employed with the Department by the time the case progresses up-
wards. Conversation with Robert W. James, Assistant Chief Counsel, October 6, 1970.
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As might be expected, the realities of public administration
do not allow for a surgical division of authority along lines of pro-
fessional expertise or any others. There are some questions that
call most clearly for resolution by engineers, and others that call
just as clearly for resolution by attorneys. But there is a vast
middle ground in which (1) both groups must share authority
because both may possess expertise that is relevant to the disposi-
tion of the issues, or (2) both groups must disclaim authority be-
cause the disposition is made on the basis of a judgment to which
neither group's professional background is of special relevance.
Questions Clearly to be Resolved by Reference to Professional
Judgment of Lawyers or Engineers
No reasonable attorney would claim any expertise that would
assist him in answering the question whether the discoloration or
chemical deterioration of concrete surfaces resulted from the appli-
cation of wood sheathing. The example is taken from specifications
for one of the Department's projects, and it could be multiplied
ad infinitum without further amplifying the basic truth it embodies,
to wit: the question, were it to arise in the context of a disputed
claim, must be answered by reference to technical expertise. By
the same token, no sensible engineer would presume to answer the
question whether, under applicable statutory provisions and judi-
cial interpretations thereof, the Department has the power to termi-
nate an entire project for reasons of "convenience." The materials
that must be consulted in order to arrive at an intelligent answer
to such a question are peculiarly those lawyers are trained to analyze,
construe, and predict upon.40
40 As previously noted, the powers of the Department to enter into contracts on
behalf of the State are governed by statutory provisions. When the Department dis-
covers that it lacks the power to take certain action in the course of contract ad-
ministration, it might seek legislative authorization to include a contract provision that
would enable it to take that action in the interests of what it judges to be better
policy. The Department relies on its attorneys not only to determine whether it lacks
the power in question, but also to draft and promote legislation to bestow it. In the
1969 session of the Legislature, the Department sought authority to terminate a con-
tract whenever the Department's "convenience" would be served thereby. Senate
Bill 593. On at least two prior occasions, in 1964 and 1967, the Department was ad-
vised by its lawyers that in the absence of such legislation, it lacked the power to
order the termination of work for which it had contracted. There are practical reasons
why on occasion the entire termination of work already under way may be advisable.
Technological developments may make a planned facility obsolete; changing require-
ments of other agencies may undermine the utility of a planned facility; or circum-
stances may suggest that construction would be better deferred to a later date, beyond
the time the present contractor could be held on the job. "Termination for conve-
nience" is a principle long recognized in federal contracting practice. See, e.g., 41
C.F.R. §§ 1-8.701.
The Department's attorneys concluded, however, that it was not a principle
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Questions Requiring Resolution by Reference to Lawyer-Engineer
Collaborative Judgment
It is no doubt obvious that the two questions chosen to exem-
plify the areas in which engineering or legal judgment is peculiarly
pertinent correspond to the conventional distinction between ques-
tions of fact and questions of law. The former do not require
for their resolution any reference to legal materials or standards.
The latter do not require cognizance of any factual components
whatsoever. But the distinction is no more secure in public admin-
istration than in any other enterprise in which it is put to use.
Problems in the determinination of legal rights and obligations
do not typically arrange themselves in the neat categories of
the wholly concrete and the wholly abstract. For purposes of deter-
mining whether to seek additional power from the Legislature, the
Department may wish to have its lawyers answer the "abstract"
question concerning the present existence of the authority to termi-
nate an entire project for reasons of convenience. But the question
may arise in quite a different fashion in the context of a particular
claim. Section 7(b) of the Standard Provisions empowers the Engi-
neer, inter alia, to order the "elimination of any portion of the
work no longer required for its proper completion," and also "the
elimination of a portion of the work, even though required for
proper completion, if, due to unforeseen causes, . . .performance
thereof would . . .be adverse to the Department's interests, and
if its elimination will not materially change the nature and extent
of the work." (emphasis added).
This authority may be warranted by the power conferred upon
the Department "to make changes in the plans and specifications."'"
In the course of contract administration, however, a Contractor
may challenge a Department order to eliminate a portion of the
work; the change, he might argue, "materially" changes the "nature
and extent of the work," and therefore falls outside the Depart-
ment's authority. In determining the validity of the argument, it
recognized in state legislation and judicial decisions construing contractual provisions
written pursuant to that legislation. If the Department were to avoid the consequences
of unauthorized termination of "integral" portions of work, new legislation was needed.
Because those consequences could be serious ones-recovery for anticipated profits,
or a decree for specific performance of the terminated contract, or a writ of mandate
to compel withdrawal of the unauthorized termination order-the Department in
1969 sought the authority to terminate for convenience. The Department's legal staff
not only drafted the bill initially, but also designed amendments to meet objections of
legislators concerned about the possible impact of the Department's use of its new
power. The bill was not enacted into law, despite unanimous passage in the State
Senate.
41 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 14377 (West 1963). See also CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11010.5
(West 1966).
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may well be important to compare the change with those that the
courts have upheld or set aside as within or outside an agency's
authority to order even in the absence of legislative authority to
terminate entire projects for reasons of convenience.42 But the issue
cannot be resolved purely by reference to such precedents. The
Contractor's argument must ultimately succeed or fail on the basis
of the circumstances of his case, and technical engineering judg-
ment is indispensable in any evaluation of the effect of the partic-
ular change on the "nature and extent of the work." In sum,
whether the change constitutes a "material" alteration of the work
can only be determined by measuring its practical effect in the
particular case against some articulated statutory and judicial con-
ceptions of the type of case to which the Department's change-
order authority extends. The nature of the question therefore
dictates a collaborative legal-engineering effort for intelligent resolu-
tion.
Matters Not Involving Professional Legal or Engineering Judgment
In addition to circumstances that call exclusively for engineer-
ing judgment, exclusively for legal judgment, and collaboratively
for both kinds of judgment, there are also circumstances in which
neither kind is peculiarly pertinent.
In one of the cases studied by the writer, the Department
ordered the deletion of some work involving the "damp-proofing"
of certain exterior walls in a pumping plant. In the exercise of tech-
nical judgment, the Department concluded that the work was not
necessary to secure wall strength. The Contractor did not challenge
the Department's authority to order that no such work be done.
Rather, he contested the Department's decision to delete from the
contract payment of the amount of money at which the work was
valued. The dampproofing, he argued, was not called for by the
contract specifications, and therefore no payment for it was con-
templated in the first place; indeed, should the Department wish
the work to be done, it would be liable for additional compensation.
The Department's contention was that the work was included in
the contract and its cost was therefore included in the Contractor's
bid. Thus the Department would be justified in deleting that cost
from the payment for the contract.
Upon the Contractor's claim for remission of the amount of
deletion (approximately $11,000), the Division Engineer denied it
with the concurrence of the legal staff. The decision was further
42 See, e.g., Hensler v. Los Angeles, 124 Cal. App. 2d 71, 268 P.2d 12 (1954)
Boomer v. Abbett, 121 Cal. App. 2d 499, 263 P.2d 476 (1953).
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approved by the Claims Appeal Board. The Specifications stated
that "[t]wo coats of dampproofing shall be applied to the exterior
walls of the pumping plant from the elevation shown on the draw-
ings to an elevation six inches below finished grade on back-filled
walls, and one foot above normal water surface on flooded walls."
(emphasis added). The drawings, however, made no reference to
dampproofing at all. The Contractor therefore contended that he
could not determine the lower level from which dampproofing was
to proceed upwards to the specified elevations. The Department's
response was two-fold: one, that the specifications clearly called
for dampproofing, and that the drawings, even without specific
notation, provided a definitive means of reasonably computing the
full extent of the contemplated dampproofing; two, that if an
ambiguity existed, the Contractor must bear its cost for his failure
to seek clarification prior to bid. 3
Despite the unanimous position of the staff to deny the claim,
the Deputy Director determined that it be granted. The failure
of the drawings to show areas of dampproofing at all was regarded
as an "oversight or error by the Department." The Contractor
should not bear the cost of the error notwithstanding his failure
to seek clarification prior to bid, because the value of the work was
4 of 1 percent of the total value of the job. Thus, "any Con-
tractor working on a job of this magnitude is not going to waste
any time on checking out an item this small and of such minor
importance to the overall bid estimate. The argument [that he
should have sought clarification] .. . is unreasonable and incon-
sistent with industry practice."
Fit into the legal scheme, the Deputy Director's determination
was that because of the small monetary value of the item, the error
was not "an error that reasonably should have been known" to the
Contractor, and therefore his failure to seek pre-bidding clarification
did not defeat his claim.44 This determination does not, however,
dispose of the staff's contention that the requirement of some damp-
proofing was set forth in the specifications with sufficient clarity
that a bidder would reasonably have included its cost in his bid;
even assuming that the bidder could not have reasonably discovered
the error or ambiguity, the Department might conclude that a rea-
sonable bidder would have supposed that some dampproofing was
contemplated by the contract, and that he computed his bid on
the basis of that supposition. This apparent defect in the "legal
logic" underlying the Deputy Director's decision merely under-
4" See note 38 and accompanying text, supra.
44 See note 38, supra.
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scores its relative unimportance as a determinant of that decision.
Having recognized that the Department erred in the preparation
and drafting of the specifications and drawings for the particular
project, the Deputy Director apparently determined that the De-
partment ought to pay for its mistake, even if in consequence the
Contractor was to receive a windfall. The determination may be
criticized or approved, but the basis on which it was made should
be recognized. It is a decision made on the basis of considerations
of administration or management. A decision in favor of the Depart-
ment might have induced greater care in reading specifications on
the part of at least the particular contractor, and readier resort to
pre-bid clarifications in future cases. On the other hand, a decision
in favor of the Contractor would seem to induce greater care in
drafting specifications on the part of the Department in future
cases. From the perspective of administration or management, the
agency's top officer in charge of the claim resolution process could
reasonably determine that the benefits of increased attention in
drafting specifications outweigh the benefits of increased attention
in reading them. Given another claim, at another time or for a larger
monetary award, he might reach a different result: circumstances
may be present that would make another case an inauspicious
occasion for delivering a reprimand to the drafting staff. The deci-
sion, however, would expectedly again be rooted in considerations
of administration or management-to which technical legal or engi-
neering expertise are of little, if any, relevance.
The incidence of decisions neatly explainable on grounds of
administration or management should not be exaggerated. More
typically, factors of policy of this sort melt into legal issues with
little stir, through the interpretation given to such terms as "reason-
able" or "material." "Matters of policy grow downward into roots
of legal interpretation, and matters of legal interpretation reach up-
ward, without a break, into matters of policy."45 Policy factors
might also operate to dissolve a claim before it reaches the boil of
dispute. Nevertheless, whenever management objectives appear to
influence the decision of particular controversies, the agency law-
yer finds himself in a difficult position. If he views the process of
claim resolution as essentially a legal process, the intrusion of
seemingly non-legal influences of policy is likely to disturb him.
He might criticize the intrusion on the ground that if it results
45 J. Pfiffner, The Role of the Lawyer in Public Administration, 20 S. CAL. L.
REV. 37, 55 (1946), paraphrasing John Dickinson's dictum, "Matters of law growdownward into roots of fact, and matters of fact reach upward, without a break, into
matters of law." See also DICKmSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY
OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 55 (1927).
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in an award that has at best a shaky legal foundation, the Depart-
ment would be making a "grant or donation of property" to a
private person in violation of the State Constitution." Or he might
criticize the management decision on the ground that policy objec-
ives can be better promoted through internal means other than the
Department's adjudicatory function. The almost instinctive rebel-
lion of lawyers at the exertion of non-legal influences on an adjudi-
catory process is indeed one of the costs from a management
perspective of a decision that has management benefits as its goal.
VI. SOME TENTATIVE GENERALIZATIONS ABOUT THE ROLE
OF LAWYERS IN CLAIM ADJUDICATION
The foregoing study has focused on the role of government
attorneys in the specialized context of administrative adjudication
of claims arising from public contracts, with particular attention
to the interplay between attorneys and engineers in that process.
Given the complexity of formal organization and human relations
within it, and the stubborn tendency of adjudicatory issues to reject
the facile affixation of labels upon them, it is impossible to formu-
late with precision the nature of the attorney's contribution and
to measure its influence. Several generalizations do emerge, how-
ever, and these appear applicable to other settings in which law-
yers and non-lawyers are brought together for that purpose of
discharging public functions.
The difficulty in arriving at a neat division of authority along
lines of professional expertise, although undoubtedly not fully
remediable, nevertheless appears to be a source of some disquietude
and possibly friction between lawyers and non-lawyers in the course
of the claim resolution process. It may be desirable that each con-
tested claim be analyzed, as sharply as possible, into factual, legal,
and policy components, in an effort to ascertain whose professional
judgment is most likely to result in a correct disposition of the
claim. When, as often happens, a collaborative enterprise is neces-
sary to define terms or apply them to a given set of facts, the
collaborative nature of the enterprise ought to be clearly under-
stood, with the participants conscious of the distinctive contribu-
tion to be made by each of them. This sort of analytical breakdown
should be assayed as early in the process as possible, but it should
be subject to revision as the nature of the claim and of the dis-
positive considerations change over time and through the adminis-
trative process.
46 CAL. CONST. § 21.
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A conscious, articulated analysis along the lines of professional
expertise may have its drawbacks. For one thing, friction may be
generated in the course of articulating such an analysis, a process
that in itself requires collaborative effort. Moreover, if areas of
professional expertise are carved out with some precision, it may
prove easier to detect invasion by one group of another's domain;
although detection may lead to correction, some may view it as
productive of still another new source of friction. Finally, it may
be objected that professional insulation might discourage the devel-
opment and recognition of multi-talented personnel having thorough-
going acquaintance with the modes of thought of more than one
discipline, and would instead require the development of brokers
or middlemen going between one staff and another.
If the avoidance of friction were the ultimate desideratum of
public administration, it may well be that a state of relative con-
fusion about the division of authority is not less attractive than
a state of relative clarity. It would appear, however, that analytical
distinctions-if drawable and drawn along functional lines-would
probably promote the reliability of decisions emanating from an
adjudicatory process within an administrative agency. The public
that supports the agency by its funds, and the private parties
affected by the agency's disbursement of these public funds, are
entitled to expect dispositions that are made by qualified persons
utilizing relevant expertise. This is indeed one measure of the fair-
ness of these dispositions.
When the individual contributions to the resolution of issues
have been made, it becomes the attorney's function to assemble
the various components in the course of coherent legal analysis
containing the recommended decision. This function, no less than
that of answering so-called pure questions of law, represents the
attorney's distinctive contribution to the decision-making process.
Personalities aside, the attorney's influence in that process probably
depends on his ability first to obtain the expertise of relevant dis-
ciplines, and then to integrate these in a manner that takes account
of the relationship among them. The effective legal memorandum
reflects an ethos of teamwork prevailing alongside identification
of specialties. The strength of the lawyer's advice is directly pro-
portional to the quality of the synthesis of expertise that supports
it.
A final word concerns top-level decisions made on the basis
of considerations of management or administration. From the view-
point of the government lawyer, it is crucial that when decisions
are made on such a basis, they be perceptible as such. Although
the ultimate decision-maker within the agency is not strictly ac-
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countable to his legal staff for the propriety of such decisions,
he ought to acknowledge the basis on which they are made. Dis-
agreement would then be healthier, and criticism more constructive,
than the estrangement a legal specialist must experience on the
occasion of reversal on "legal" grounds by a non-lawyer. The rela-
tionship between legal work and department policy-making lies at
the heart of any analysis of the government lawyer's role,47 although
its significance is muted in the context of administrative adjudica-
tion. A thorough study48 of the expectations and self-perceptions
of government lawyers would greatly improve our understanding
of that relationship, and could assist in the development of condi-
tions conducive to the exercise of professional legal expertise in
accordance with the professional precepts of lawyers, without
obscuring other legitimate objectives of public administration.
APPENDIX A
CONTRACT FORM
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE RESOURCES AGENCY
DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES
CONTRACT FOR
TEHACHAPI AFTERBAY
STATE WATER FACILITIES
CALIFORNIA AQUEDUCT
TEHACHAPI DIVISION
LOS ANGELES AND KERN COUNTIES
CALIFORNIA
SPECIFICATION NO. 69-29
CONTRACT NO. 358842
THIS CONTRACT, made in duplicate this day of
, 19-, in accordance with the provisions of the
State Contract Act and other applicable laws of the State of California, between
the State of California, acting by and through its Department of Water Re-
sources, hereinafter called the Department, and
47 See Pfiffner, supra, note 45. See also Hensler v. Los Angeles, 124 Cal. App. 2d
71, 268 P.2d 12 (1954) ; Boomer v. Abbett, 121 Cal. App. 2d 449, 263 P.2d 476 (1953).
See Bayer, Care and Feeding of Government Lawyers, 56 A.B.A.J. 668 (1970); Marx,
Some Aspects of Legal Work in Administrative Agencies, 96 U. PA. L. REv. 354
(1947-48).
48 Such work now in progress is being done by my colleague, Professor John W.
Whelan, under a grant from the Ford Foundation to study various aspects of the
work of attorneys in California state government. The writer is indebted to Professor
Whelan for insights and encouragements in the preparation of this paper.
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hereinafter called the Contractor;
WITNESSETH, That the Department and the Contractor mutually agree
as follows:
ARTICLE I.-This contract includes and incorporates by this reference
the notice to contractors and Contractor's bid for the above named project, the
contract bonds and certificate of liability insurance furnished by the Contractor
pursuant to his bid and attached hereto, the drawings and specifications for
such project, all addenda to the above documents, and all authorized changes
therein. All definitions stated in the Standard Provisions of the specifications
shall apply herein.
ARTICLE II.-The Contractor shall provide and furnish, except as other-
wise expressly provided in the specifications, all materials, equipment, labor,
methods, processes, construction materials and equipment, tools, plants, sup-
plies, power, water, transportation and other things necessary to complete in a
good and workmanlike manner, in accordance with the drawings, specifications
and all other parts of this contract, and all of the facilities specified, indicated,
shown, or contemplated by the drawings, specifications and other parts of this
contract as comprising and necessary for completion of the above-named project,
and shall perform all other obligations imposed upon him by this contract.
ARTICLE III.-The Department shall pay to the Contractor, and the Con-
tractor shall accept, as full compensation for performance of his obligations
under ARTICLE II and for all risks and liabilities in connection therewith,
the prices set forth in the Contractor's bid, all in accordance with and subject
to the express terms and conditions of the specifications, the Contractor's bid,
and other parts of this contract, and the Department shall perform all other
obligations imposed upon it by this contract.
ARTICLE IV.-This contract shall apply to and bind the successors and
assigns of the parties hereto.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this contract
as of the date first above written.
I hereby certify that I have examined the within contract and find it to be
in accordance with the provisions of the State Contract Act.
Attorney General of the State of California
By
Deputy Attorney General
Dated
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APPENDIX B
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE RESOURCES AGENCY
DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES
PROCEDURES FOR PROCESSING CLAIMS ON
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS
The Department's administrative procedures for the consideration and
determination of contract claims are set forth below. These procedures supple-
ment, and do not change or qualify, any of the requirements of the specifications
pertaining to the submission and decision of contract claims.
Following submission by the Contractor of a Notice of Potential Claim in
accordance with the specifications, the Project Engineer will discuss the matter
as appropriate with the Contractor in an attempt to resolve the issue.
Following submission by the Contractor of a formal contract claim in
accordance with the specifications, there will be a thorough investigation by
project office and Construction Branch headquarters representatives, including
review of additional information and data as may be furnished by the Con-
tractor. When this investigation is concluded, the Chief, Construction Branch or
his designated representative and the Project Engineer will confer with the
Contractor on the claim. If agreement as to the disposition of the claim cannot
be reached, the claim will be referred to the Division Engineer, Design and
Construction, for decision. Claims excepted from the release on contract, unless
subsequently withdrawn by the Contractor, require a decision by the Division
Engineer.
In reaching his decision, the Division Engineer, Design and Construction,
will meet with the Contractor, as appropriate, to discuss the claim. He will
notify the Contractor by letter of his decision on the claim, stating any adjust-
ment of prices and/or extensions of time due under the claim. The decision of
the Division Engineer, Design and Construction, shall be final and conclusive,
unless within 30 days after receipt thereof the Contractor makes written request
for review and decision by the Deputy Director, State Water Project. Such
request shall be addressed to the Deputy Director, State Water Project.
The Deputy Director, State Water Project, will consider the entire claim
as submitted to the Division Engineer, Design and Construction. He will
normally refer the claim to the Department's Claims Appeal Board for detailed
review and recommendation. The Contractor will be given an opportunity to
meet with the Claims Appeal Board and submit additional information. The
Board will make its recommendations to the Deputy Director, State Water
Project, who will issue his decision to the Contractor. The written decision of
the Deputy Director, State Water Project, will be final and conclusive under
the contract.
Revised
June 1968
19721
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
APPENDIX C
DRAFT
To:
(Contractor)
Reference is made to your claim filed on for
(date) (amount)
involving , Specification , which was re-
ferred to the Division Engineer, Division of Design and Construction, for
decision, and to Section 8 of the specifications.
The Department has been reorganized in an area affecting the claims handl-
ing process. In the future, our first level of claims decision will be the Chief,
Construction Branch, as the designated representative of the Deputy Director.
Since your claim has not yet been decided by the former Division Engineer, it
is being transferred to our Chief, Construction Branch, for decision. If you
are dissatisfied with his decision, you will, as in the past, have the right of
appeal to the Deputy Director who will utilize the assistance of a Claims
Appeal Board.
Let me assure you that your claim will receive the same careful attention
that it would have received with the Division Engineer and that you will be
given the same opportunity to present your position on the claim as he would
have given you.
The Chief, Construction Branch, will be in contact with you shortly re-
garding your claim(s). If you have any comments on this revised procedure, we
would sincerely appreciate your early advice.
Sincerely yours,
Deputy Director
